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Despite the wealth of research on differences between experts and novices with respect
to their perceptual-cognitive background (e.g., mental representations, gaze behavior),
little is known about the change of these perceptual-cognitive components over the
course of motor learning. In the present study, changes in one’s mental representation,
quiet eye behavior, and outcome performance were examined over the course of skill
acquisition as it related to physical and mental practice. Novices (N = 45) were assigned
to one of three conditions: physical practice, combined physical plus mental practice,
and no practice. Participants in the practice groups trained on a golf putting task over
the course of 3 days, either by repeatedly executing the putt, or by both executing and
imaging the putt. Findings revealed improvements in putting performance across both
practice conditions. Regarding the perceptual-cognitive changes, participants practicing
mentally and physically revealed longer quiet eye durations as well as more elaborate
representation structures in comparison to the control group, while this was not the
case for participants who underwent physical practice only. Thus, in the present study,
combined mental and physical practice led to both formation of mental representations
in long-term memory and longer quiet eye durations. Interestingly, the length of the
quiet eye directly related to the degree of elaborateness of the underlying mental
representation, supporting the notion that the quiet eye reflects cognitive processing.
This study is the first to show that the quiet eye becomes longer in novices practicing a
motor action. Moreover, the findings of the present study suggest that perceptual and
cognitive adaptations co-occur over the course of motor learning.
Keywords: motor imagery, skill representation, SDA-M, eye-tracking, quiet eye, golf putting, skill acquisition
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INTRODUCTION
Research in sports has shown that experts do not only diﬀer from
novices in their reproducibly superior performance, but also in
their perceptual-cognitive background, i.e., in their underlying
skill representation (e.g., Ericsson and Smith, 1991; Schack and
Mechsner, 2006; Ericsson, 2007; Hill, 2007) as well as in their
gaze behavior (e.g., Vickers, 1992; Williams et al., 2002; Campbell
and Moran, 2014). To this extent, perceptual-cognitive abilities
are seen as one of the key components associated with high-level
performance. With respect to skill acquisition, recent research has
indicated that practice has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the cognitive
system underlying motor learning and performance (e.g., Frank
et al., 2013; Land et al., 2014). Speciﬁcally, practice has been
shown to lead to the establishment of mental representations,
which are stated to aid motor performance (e.g., Ericsson, 2003;
Land et al., 2013). Moreover, diﬀerent types of practice have
been shown to diﬀerentially inﬂuence mental representation
development, with practice that incorporates motor imagery
and practice that focuses on movement eﬀects adding to the
development of mental representations of the action (e.g., Frank
et al., 2014; Land et al., 2014). However, in an attempt to provide
a more holistic account of the changes associated with learning,
and the inﬂuence of diﬀerent learning strategies, it is important to
consider associated perceptual changes accompanying those seen
in both the cognitive and motor system.
The most common means to acquire a motor skill and
to induce persistent improvement in performance is through
physical repetition of the overt movement to be learned.
However, research has also shown that mental practice, either
alone or combined with physical practice, can also aid in the
acquisition of skill. This form of practice is based on mental
repetition by way of motor imagery that is the covert simulation
of a movement in one’s mind without subsequent movement
execution (e.g., Jeannerod, 2001, 2004; Moran et al., 2012). While
both types of practice have shown to inﬂuence performance and
to promote motor learning (e.g., Feltz and Landers, 1983; Feltz
et al., 1988; Hinshaw, 1991; Grouios, 1992; Driskell et al., 1994),
physical practice has been demonstrated to be superior to mental
practice, but mental practice has been shown to be better than
no practice at all (for a meta-analysis, see Driskell et al., 1994).
Apart from the obvious changes inmotor performance associated
with these practice strategies, the perceptual-cognitive changes
that occur with respect to mental or physical practice are less
clear.
Gaze behavior, and in particular the quiet eye phenomenon,
has been considered a key element in the perceptual-cognitive
processes underlying learning and performance. According to
Vickers (2009, p. 280), the quiet eye is deﬁned as
“the ﬁnal ﬁxation or tracking gaze that is located on a speciﬁc
location or object in the visuomotor workspace within 3◦ of visual
angle for a minimum of 100 ms. The onset of the quiet eye occurs
prior to the ﬁnal movement in the task and the oﬀset occurs when
the gaze deviates oﬀ the object or location by more than 3◦ of
visual angle for a minimum of 100 ms (. . .).”
This behavior (i.e., the ﬁnal ﬁxation prior to movement onset,
such as the onset of the backswing during golf putting) is thought
to be an important indicator of action-related information
processing. The quite eye phenomenon has been observed and
investigated across a variety of sports and motor tasks (for
reviews, see Vickers, 2007, 2009, 2011), including golf (e.g.,
Vickers, 1992; Wilson and Pearcy, 2009; Vine and Wilson, 2010;
Vine et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2013; Ziv and Lidor, 2015).
Up to now, research on quiet eye has elicited distinct
diﬀerences in this type of gaze behavior between skilled and
non-skilled performers. Particularly, and probably the most
prominent ﬁnding so far, is that the quiet eye duration of skilled
performers is longer compared to non-skilled performers (e.g.,
Vickers, 1992, 1996; Janelle et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2002).
Moreover, skilled performers have been shown to perform with
an optimal duration of the quiet eye depending on the type of
task (e.g., Williams et al., 2002; Vickers, 2007). In the speciﬁc case
of golf putting, experts’ quiet eye period lasted in between 2 and
3 s, while non-experts’ quiet eye durations lasted around 1.5 s
(e.g., Vickers, 1992, 2007). Furthermore, performance has been
shown to be directly related to quiet eye duration. For example,
in golf longer quiet eye periods have been reported for successful
putts compared to unsuccessful putts (e.g., Wilson and Pearcy,
2009; Vine et al., 2013). Overall, the quiet eye has been found
to be a major factor related to perceptual-cognitive expertise,
diﬀerentiating between experts and non-experts (e.g., Mann et al.,
2007).
Although the underlying mechanisms of the quiet eye are still
highly debated (for overviews, see Klostermann, 2014; Gonzalez
et al., 2015), the most prominent account assumes that the quiet
eye behavior relates to a critical period of information processing
related to the motor action to be executed (e.g., Vickers, 1996,
2009). As such, the quiet eye suggests that higher order cognitive
processes control gaze behavior (e.g., Williams et al., 2002). This
behavior should be based on prior experience, and thus on the
degree of elaborateness of the mental representation (for details,
see next paragraph). In other words, the more experienced the
individual, the more elaborate the representation is, and the
more functional the information processing directly relating to
the motor action should be. In this sense, mental representation
development and prolongation of the quiet eye should relate
to one another. However, despite the tremendous amount of
research on expert-novice diﬀerences with respect to quiet eye
behavior, research examining the changes in quiet eye behavior
over the course of learning is lacking. Both the quiet eye and its
changes over time as well as its relation to the underlying mental
representation, have yet to be examined.
Perceptual-cognitive approaches to motor control and
learning assume motor actions to be guided by way of
representations containing information about the perceptual
eﬀects of the actions (e.g., theory of anticipative behavioral
control: Hoﬀmann, 1993; theory of event coding: Hommel
et al., 2001; cognitive action architecture approach: Schack,
2002, 2004). According to the cognitive action architecture
approach (CAA-A; for an overview, see Schack and Ritter,
2009), motor actions are represented in memory as well-
integrated representational networks or taxonomies comprised
of perceptual-cognitive units (i.e., basic action concepts; BACs).
Analogous to object representations and the idea of basic object
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concepts (e.g., Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978; Mervis
and Rosch, 1981; Hoﬀmann, 1986, 1990), BACs represent
cognitive compilations of movement elements/body postures
and their corresponding perceptual eﬀects, which are closely
tied to the attainment of action goals (e.g., Schack, 2004, 2012).
For instance, grip check as a BAC of the golf putt is thought
to represent a cognitive chunk serving a particular action goal
(i.e., to ensure an optimal grip during the preparation of the
putting movement before initiation of the backswing). As
such it is comprised of the corresponding body posture (e.g.,
standing up right, hips ﬂexed, upper body leaning forward,
holding the putter in hands) and movement elements (e.g.,
take grip, move ﬁngers until in right position) together with
their sensory consequences (e.g., feel hands touching the
surface of club; sense slight pressure in ﬁngers, see both
hands touch each other; for other BACs related to putting, see
Table 1).
Mental representations of complex action are believed to
consist of hierarchical taxonomies comprised of BACs. The
arrangement and clustering of these BACs within the taxonomy
are important, because they control and guide the execution of
the skill. Motor learning, according to the CAA-A, is reﬂected by
functional changes in the arrangement and organization of BACs
within the taxonomies that are held within long-term memory.
Speciﬁcally, during learning by repeated (imagined or actual)
execution of a complex action, the relations and the groupings
of action concepts (i.e., mental representation structure) are
modiﬁed (e.g., Schack, 2003, 2004, 2006; Schack and Ritter, 2013).
This process is suggested to result in action-related structure
formation (i.e., perceptual-cognitive scaﬀolding) in long-term
memory.
TABLE 1 | Basic action concepts (BACs) of the golf putt.
N◦ Basic action concept (BAC) Movement phase
(1) Shoulders parallel to target line Preparation
(2) Align club face square to target line
(3) Grip check
(4) Look to the hole
(5) Rotate shoulders away from the ball Backswing
(6) Keep arms-shoulder triangle
(7) Smooth transition
(8) Rotate shoulders toward the ball Forward swing
(9) Accelerate club
(10) Impact with the ball Impact
(11) Club face square to target line at impact
(12) Follow-through
(13) Rotate shoulders through the ball
(14) Decelerate club Attenuation
(15) Direct clubhead to planned position
(16) Look to the outcome
Each of the 16 basic action concepts (BACs) of the golf putt can be functionally
assigned to one of the movement phases. The numbers on the left relate to the
different BACs; they do not reflect a particular order, but serve to better display the
concepts in Figures 3–5.
Until now, experts have been shown to diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from novices in the way these representations are structured
in long-term memory, with experts holding structured
representations with groupings of BACs reﬂecting the functional
phases of the motor action, whereas the representations of
non-experts were not meaningfully or functionally organized
(e.g., Schack and Mechsner, 2006; Bläsing et al., 2009; Stöckel
et al., 2015). More recently, the mental representation of a motor
action has been shown to functionally adapt in the direction
of an elaborate representation during motor learning, thereby
relating more so to the biomechanical task demands (Frank et al.,
2013, 2014; Land et al., 2014). Speciﬁcally, Frank et al. (2013)
investigated the changes in skill representation during motor
learning incorporating physical practice. The authors found
that skill representation of novices practicing (i.e., repeatedly
executing without technical instructions) a golf putting task for
several days changed over the course of practice such that the
novices’ representations developed in the direction of that of an
expert. More speciﬁcally, novices’ unstructured representations
became more structured over time, with the groupings of
BACs pertaining to the movement phases of the putt (i.e., the
preparation, the forward swing and the impact) after practice.
In contrast, novices who did not practice the putt revealed no
changes in their underlying representation structure, and thus
their representation remained unstructured.
In a more recent study, the adaptation of mental
representation according to type of practice was investigated
(Frank et al., 2014). Novices practiced the golf putt under one
of four conditions: mental practice, physical practice, combined
mental, and physical practice, and no practice. Both putting
performance and mental representation of the putt were assessed
prior to and after 3 days of practice, and again after a 72 h
retention period. While the putting performance of the groups
reﬂected improvements as expected (i.e., the combined practice
group performing best, followed by the physical practice group,
while the mental practice group performed worst after practice),
mental representations developed diﬀerently between the groups.
While the physical practice group showed only marginal changes
in representation structure over time, both the mental practice
and the combined practice group revealed major changes in
their representations of the putt after the acquisition phase.
That is, after mental practice and after combined mental and
physical practice, the trained novices elicited more elaborate
representation structures, reﬂecting the functional phases of the
movement (i.e., the preparation phase, the swing and the impact
phase, and the attenuation phase). From this, representation
structures seem to develop diﬀerently during motor learning,
depending on the type of practice.
In sum, although much attention has been directed toward
diﬀerences between experts and novices with respect to their
perceptual-cognitive background (e.g., mental representations,
quiet eye behavior), less research has focused on the development
and change of these perceptual-cognitive components over the
course of motor learning. From expert-novice diﬀerences alone,
no clear conclusions can be made regarding the type and extent
of motor and perceptual-cognitive changes that occur during
the learning process. Thus, it is essential to take a longitudinal
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perspective, in order to learn about the perceptual and cognitive
changes that occur within the motor action system over the
course of this process and to be able to eﬀectively guide the
motor learning process. Accordingly, the main purpose of the
present study was to investigate the inﬂuence of practice (i.e.,
physical practice and combined physical plus mental practice) on
both the mental representation and quiet eye behavior of learners
practicing a golf putting task. Furthermore, we were interested in
whether the structure formation in mental representation related
to the duration of the quiet eye after learning.
In line with previous research, we expected putting
performance to improve as a result of practice, with the combined
physical plus mental practice group performing equivalent or
better than the physical practice only group after practice
with regards to motor performance. Regarding perceptual-
cognitive changes, we expected mental representations to
develop over the course of practice, with representation
structures being more elaborate after practice compared to
no practice. In addition, we expected combined physical
plus mental practice to reveal more elaborate representations
compared to physical practice only. Furthermore, given
that mental representations underpin the processing of
task related information, longer quiet eye durations were
expected to be associated with more developed mental
representations. Consequently, we predicted that quiet eye
durations would be longer following practice in comparison
to no practice. Finally, we expected quiet eye durations to be
longest for the type of practice revealing the most elaborate
representations after practice (i.e., the combined physical plus
mental practice).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-ﬁve university students participated in the present study.
None of the participants had any prior experience with
golf putting. Participants were assigned to one of three
conditions1: combined mental and physical practice (n = 16,
Mage = 24.38 years, SD = 2.73, 8 female), physical practice
(n = 15, Mage = 25.73 years, SD = 2.99, 10 female) and no
practice (n = 14, Mage = 27.00 years, SD = 8.74, 9 female). The
study was conducted in accordance with local ethical guidelines,
and conformed to the declaration of Helsinki.
Tasks and Measures
Outcome Performance
Participants performed a golf-putting task on an artiﬁcial indoor
putting green (size: 4 m × 9 m), using a standard putter and
a standard golf ball. The task consisted of putting the ball to
a target three meters away from the starting point. The target,
projected onto the surface of the green via an overhead projector,
corresponded to the size of a regulation golf hole (i.e., 10.8 cm
1Participants were assigned to the diﬀerent groups based on their initial putting
performance at pre-test. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences existed between the groups at
the initiation of putting performance.
in diameter). Participants were asked to putt the golf ball as
accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was
supposed to stop. Putting performance was recorded by way of
a motion capture system (Vicon Motion Systems, Oxford, UK).
Speciﬁcally, 6 T10 CCD cameras captured and tracked the ball
rolling and stopping. The recordings were made with a temporal
resolution of 200 Hz and a spatial resolution of approximately
0.25 mm.
Mental Representation Structure
Structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-
M) was employed to assess mental representation structures of
the putt, providing psychometric data on the structuring and
dimensioning of mental representations of complex movements
in long-term memory (for more details, see Schack, 2012). In
other words, the SDA-M serves to determine relations between
and the grouping of basic action concepts (i.e., BACs) of a
motor action. For the speciﬁc purpose of the present study,
a pre-determined set of 16 BACs of the putt were used (see
Table 1), each BAC pertaining to one particular movement phase
of the golf putt: preparation (BAC 1–4), backswing (BAC 5–
7), forward swing (BAC 8–9), impact (10–13), and attenuation
(BAC 14–16).
The SDA-M consists of several steps. In a ﬁrst step, a
split procedure (for more details, see next paragraph) is
performed resulting in a distance scaling between the BACs of
a predetermined set. Next, a hierarchical cluster analysis is used
to outline the structure of the given set of BACs. Following
this, a factor analysis can be used in order to determine the
dimensions in the structured set of BACs. In a last step, an
analysis of invariance within- and between-groups serves to
compare diﬀerent cluster solutions (for details, see Schack, 2012).
In addition, similarity between cluster solutions was examined
(for details on both analyses, see Data Analysis section).
More speciﬁcally, the splitting task (i.e., ﬁrst step of the SDA-
M) proceeds as follows: while one BAC of the putt is permanently
shown on a computer screen (i.e., the anchor concept), the rest
of the BACs are displayed one after another in randomized
order. For each of the BACs being displayed together with
the anchor concept, participants are asked to decide whether
the given BAC is related to the anchor concept or not during
movement execution. Once the participant has ﬁnished a list of
BACs, another BAC takes the anchor position and the procedure
continues. After each BAC has been compared to the remaining
BACs (n−1), the splitting task is completed.
Gaze Behavior
Gaze behavior was measured by way of eye-tracking during
putting. Accordingly, eye-movements were recorded using a
head-mounted portable eye-tracking system with an eye and a
scene camera. Speciﬁcally, the SMI iViewX HED mobile eye-
tracker is a corneal reﬂex system that operates monocular at
a sampling rate of 200 Hz, with a gaze position accuracy
<0.5◦−1◦. Each recorded scene video had a resolution of
376 pixels × 240 pixels at 25 fps (1 frame = 40 ms). This
system allows for the recording of eye-movements in natural
environments in which participants move and interact with their
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environment while performing complex movements (i.e., vision
in action paradigm; see Vickers, 2007).
Imagery Ability
To assess visual and kinesthetic imagery ability, the revised
version of the Movement Imagery Questionnaire (MIQ-R; Hall
and Martin, 1997) was administered. During this procedure,
participants perform, then imagine and ﬁnally rate their imagery
experience of four diﬀerent movements. During their imagery,
participants are instructed to either “see” or “feel” one of the
four movements without actually performing. Following this,
participants are asked to rate the ease or diﬃculty of imaging the
movement on a 7-point Likert scale. Thus, participants imagine
each of the four movements, by focusing either on the visual
modality or the kinesthetic modality separately by instruction,
resulting in a ﬁnal rating of eight items.
Manipulation Check
In order to control whether participants performed the
imagery as instructed (cf. Goginsky and Collins, 1996), a post-
experimental questionnaire was administered after each practice
session to participants practicing mentally. Speciﬁcally, we asked
participants of the combined mental and physical practice group
to report their imagery in detail. First, participants were asked
to describe the imagery content shorthand. Second, participants
had to rate on a 7-point Likert scales (1 = very diﬃcult, 7 = very
easy; 1 = never, 7 = always), how easy it had been to follow
the instructions in general, how often they used an external
perspective and how often they used an internal perspective.
Third, participants were asked to indicate how easy it had been to
“see” and how easy it was to “feel” the putt during their imagery.
Finally, we asked participants whether they had experienced any
problems and, if so, to describe them in detail.
Procedure
The present study consisted of a pre-test, an acquisition phase of
three consecutive days of practice, a post-test, and a retention-test
after 3 days of rest (see Table 2).
Pre-test
At the beginning of the study, participants signed informed
consent forms. Next, in order to become familiar with
the task at hand, participants watched a video showing a
skilled golfer performing the putting task. Following this,
the eye-tracking system was calibrated, employing a standard
ﬁve-point calibration procedure. In order to assess participants’
initial putting performance and gaze behavior, each participant
performed two warm-up putts followed by 20 putts. Participants
were asked to putt a golf ball as accurately as possible to
the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. After
the putting, an introduction to the splitting task was given.
This procedure served to assess the participant’s initial mental
representation structure of the putt. Accordingly, in order to
ensure comprehension of the concepts, a randomized list of
the 16 BACs of the putt was presented and explained to the
participants. After having read general instructions on how to
complete the splitting task, participants were explicitly instructed
to decide on a yes/no-basis whether the presented basic action
concepts were related to one another or not during movement
execution. Following this, participants performed the splitting
task. Finally, each participant completed the MIQ-R as an
indicator of imagery ability.
Acquisition Phase
During the next 3 days, participants either practiced the putt
(practice groups), or did not partake in putting practice (control
group).
Physical practice (PP) group
Three blocks of 10 putts were performed on each practice day
in the PP condition. Prior to each block, participants were asked
to putt as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball
was supposed to stop. Importantly, no other information than
the visible outcome of the putt (i.e., knowledge of result) was
available to the participants. That is, no additional information
such as technical feedback (i.e., knowledge of performance) was
given to the participants during the acquisition phase.
TABLE 2 | Design of the study including three test days and an acquisition phase of 3 days.
Pre-test Acquisition Post-test Retention-test
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 8
Combined physical and mental
practice (CP) group (n = 16)
Eye-tracking Physical + mental practice (executed and imagined putts) Eye-tracking Eye-tracking
Putting task Putting task Putting task
SDA-M SDA-M SDA-M
Physical practice (PP) group
(n = 15)
Eye-tracking Physical practice (executed putts only) Eye-tracking Eye-tracking
Putting task Putting task Putting task
SDA-M SDA-M SDA-M
No practice (NP) control group
(n = 14)
Eye-tracking No practice (neither executed nor imagined putts) Eye-tracking Eye-tracking
Putting task Putting task Putting task
SDA-M SDA-M SDA-M
SDA-M: structural dimensional analysis of mental representation; putting task on test days: 2 warm- up putts followed by 20 putts; putting practice during acquisition
phase: 3 × 20 imagined and executed putts (combined mental and physical practice group) or 3 × 10 executed putts (physical practice group) per day for the practice
groups.
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Combined mental and physical practice (CP) group
Three blocks of 20 putts were performed on each practice
day in the combined mental and physical practice condition,
with each block consisting of 10 imagined and 10 actual putts.
Prior to each block, participants were asked to take the starting
position. While participants were standing upright on the green
with the putter in their hands, the imagery script was read out
loud to each participant. Participants were asked to imagine
the putting movement as well as the ball rolling toward the
target and stopping on the target, as predeﬁned by the script.
They were further told to imagine from an internal perspective,
to incorporate all the senses in their imagery, and to try and
imagine as clearly and as vividly as possible. The information
on imagery perspective, imagery modality, and imagery vividness
was intentionally given in order to control for as many aspects
during imagery as possible and to optimize the eﬃcacy of the
imagery intervention (cf. Holmes and Collins, 2001). As soon
as the reading was ﬁnished, participants imagined repeatedly
the putting movement on their own. Participants were asked to
hold their eyes closed during their imagery and to slightly raise
their index ﬁnger each time they had ﬁnished a putt in their
minds. This procedure allowed the participant to concentrate on
themselves and their imagery and, at the same time, to make
it possible for the experimenter to control for the number of
imagined putts per block without disturbing the participants’
imagery. Next, during actual putting, participants were instructed
to putt as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was
supposed to stop. No technical instructions were given. Finally,
participants ﬁlled out a post-experimental questionnaire at the
end of each practice session.
No practice (NP; control) group
During the acquisition phase, the control group neither imagined
nor executed the putt.
Post- and Retention-Test
Participants were retested 1 day after the acquisition phase,
as well as after a retention interval of 3 days. Prior to post-
test and retention-test assessment, the same standard ﬁve-point
calibration procedure was used to calibrate the eye-tracking
system. Next, each participant performed again the two warm-up
putts followed by 20 putts. Both their gaze behavior and putting
performance were measured. Following this, all participants
completed the splitting task in order to determine their ﬁnal
mental representation structures of the putting movement.
Data Analysis
Outcome Performance
By capturing the ﬁnal ball position after each putt, putting
performance was assessed. From these data, two outcome
variables were calculated for each test day. Speciﬁcally, based
on the x and y coordinates of each putt with the center of the
target as origin of the axes, two-dimensional error scores were
determined (for details, see Hancock et al., 1995). Accordingly,
putting accuracy was measured by mean radial error (MRE).
MRE is deﬁned as a subject’s average distance of each putt
outcome from the center of the target in mm. Putting consistency
was measured by bivariate variable error (BVE), analogous to
variable error in one-dimensional analyses. BVE was deﬁned as
the square root of a subject’s k shots’ mean squared distance from
their centroids inmm. A subject’s centroid is a positionally typical
shot whose coordinates are given by the average x and average y
value of a subject’s shots in mm.
In order to ensure that performance between groups did
not diﬀer at pre-test, a 1 × 3 [test day (pre) × group (PP,
CP, NP) ANOVA was performed on both MRE and BVE. For
putting performance over time, a 3 × 3 test day (pre, post,
retention)× group (PP, CP, NP)] mixed-model ANOVAwith test
day as a within-subjects factor and group as a between-subjects
factor was performed on each of the dependent variables. For
post hoc analysis, independent t-tests were conducted. A Holm-
Bonferroni correction was employed in order to account for the
inﬂation of type I errors (Holm, 1979). Cohen’s d was used as an
estimate of eﬀect size (Cohen, 1992).
Mental Representation Structure
The structure of each participant’s mental representation was
determined by way of a cluster analysis. With the help of this
procedure, the information on the distances between BACs, as
obtained by the splitting task, was transformed into dendrograms
outlining the structure of the BACs of the putt. For the purpose
of the present study, mean group dendrograms were calculated
for each group and test day (for more details see Schack, 2012).
An alpha-level of α = 0.05 was chosen for all cluster analyses,
resulting in a critical value dcrit = 3.41. To explain, BACs in a
given cluster solution were considered not related when being
linked above this critical value, while BACs were considered
related when being linked below this value and thus resulted in
a cluster.
To compare cluster solutions, two analyses were conducted.
First, analyses of invariance were used to learn about diﬀerences
between cluster solutions (Lander, 1991, 1992; see Schack, 2012).
Accordingly, cluster solutions are considered diﬀerent (i.e.,
variant) for α < 0.68, while cluster solutions are considered the
same (i.e., invariant) for α≥ 0.68. Second, to further examine the
similarity between cluster solutions and a reference, the adjusted
rand index (ARI; Rand, 1971; Santos and Embrechts, 2009) was
used. The ARI serves as an index of similarity, ranging on a scale
from −1 to 1. Indices between “−1” and “1” mark the degree
of similarity between two cluster solutions, with “1” indicating
that two cluster solutions are the same. For the purpose of the
present study, ARI was used to investigate the degree of similarity
between mean group dendrograms and an expert dendrogram
reﬂecting well the movement phases (i.e., preparation, backswing,
forward swing, impact, and attenuation).
Gaze Behavior
The quiet eye period was assessed by the duration of the ﬁnal
ﬁxation before movement onset for each putt (see Vickers, 2007,
2009). Accordingly, eye-tracking data were analyzed frame by
frame. The number of frames for the ﬁnal ﬁxation prior to
the initiation of the backswing was coded. From this, ﬁxation
duration for each putt was calculated. In line with previous
studies (e.g., Vine and Wilson, 2010), the quiet eye analysis was
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performed on a subset of trials (i.e., every fourth); a total of 675
putts. Furthermore, due to problems during the tracking of one
participant’s eye movements resulting in poor data quality, the
data of one subject were excluded from subsequent data analyses.
In order to ensure that groups did not diﬀer in their quiet eye
behavior at pre-test, a 1 × 3 [test day (pre) × group (PP, CP, NP)]
ANOVA was performed on quiet eye duration.
In order to examine the quiet eye over time, a 3 × 3 [test
day (pre, post, retention) × group (PP, CP, NP)] mixed model
ANOVA with test day as within subjects factor and group as
between subjects factor was performed on ﬁnal ﬁxation duration
prior to movement onset. For post hoc analyses, independent
t-tests were conducted. Again, a Holm-Bonferroni correction was
employed in order to account for the inﬂation of type I errors
(Holm, 1979) and Cohen’s d was used as an estimate of eﬀect size
(Cohen, 1992).
Finally, in order to investigate the relationship between
elaborateness in mental representation structure and gaze
behavior after learning, a one-tailed Pearson product-moment
correlation was computed between adjusted rand indices for each
individual’s representation structure (in comparison to the expert
reference structure) and quiet eye duration.
RESULTS
Imagery Ability
Participants in the CP group scored 44.38 (SD = 6.07; 5.55 per
item) on average for overall imagery ability, 23.63 (SD = 2.66;
5.91 per item) for visual imagery ability, and 20.75 (SD = 5.00;
5.12 per item) for kinesthetic imagery ability. Thus, participants’
average score per item was approximately 6, easy to see, for the
visual imagery ability scale, and 5, somewhat easy to feel, for
the kinesthetic imagery ability scale. This is considered as being
suﬃcient for subsequent mental practice (e.g., Smith and Collins,
2004; Smith et al., 2008).
Manipulation Check
For the CP group, participants’ manipulation check responses
were analyzed to control whether participants adhered to the
instructions given during mental practice sessions. With respect
to imagery content, each participant mentioned in their imagery
descriptions both the putting movement and the ball rolling,
indicating that they had imagined the content that had been
instructed. For the internal imagery perspective, mean scores
during acquisition phase were 6.29 (SD = 0.69), very often,
and for external imagery perspective 2.36 (SD = 1.42), rarely.
Thus, participants of the CP group performed their imagery
mainly from an internal perspective. In addition, participants
found it easy to “see” and to “feel” the movement while
imaging. Speciﬁcally, participants scored an average of 5.47
(SD = 0.96), somewhat easy to see, for visual imagery and 4.78
(SD = 1.33), somewhat easy to feel, for kinesthetic imagery.
Moreover, participants in general found it easy to follow the
instructions during imagery, as indicated by mean scores of
5.52 (SD = 1.04). Also, none of the participants reported any
problems during imagery sessions. From this, it can be assumed
that participants of the CP group had been able to perform the
imagery as instructed. This was considered a prerequisite for
subsequent data analyses.
Outcome Performance
Mean radial error and bivariate variable error of the three
groups from pre-, to post-, and to retention-test is displayed in
Figures 1 and 2. In addition, descriptives are presented inTable 3.
Both, MRE F(2,42) = 0.008, p = 0.992, η2p = 0.000, and BVE
F(2,42) = 0.086, p = 0.918, η2p = 0.004, did not diﬀer between
groups at pre-test. For accuracy, a repeated measures ANOVA
on MRE indicated a signiﬁcant test day × group interaction,
F(4,84) = 4.042, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.161. Post hoc analyses
revealed that only the CP group, t(28) = −2.893, p = 0.007
(αcrit = 0.017), d = 1.05, putted signiﬁcantly more accurate than
the NP group at post-test. The diﬀerence between the PP group
and the NP group failed to reach signiﬁcance, t(27) = −2.167,
p = 0.039 (αcrit = 0.025), d = 0.80. Furthermore, no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences were found between the PP and the CP group,
t(29) = −0.740, p = 0.465 (αcrit = 0.05), d = 0.27. After
a retention-interval of 3 days, however, both the CP group,
t(15.830) = −3.813, p = 0.002 (αcrit = 0.017), d = 1.43, and the
PP group, t(27) = −2.748, p = 0.011 (αcrit = 0.025), d = 1.01,
performed with greater putting accuracy compared to the NP
group, while no diﬀerence was found between the PP and the
CP group, t(29) = −0.998, p = 0.327 (αcrit = 0.05), d = 0.35.
For consistency, a repeated measures ANOVA on BVE indicated
a signiﬁcant test day × group interaction, F(4,84) = 3.615,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.147. Post hoc analyses revealed that the CP
group putted more consistently compared to the NP group at
post-test, t(22.815) = −2.989, p = 0.007 (αcrit = 0.017), d = 1.11,
while this was not the case for the PP group, t(27) = −1.343,
p = 0.191 (αcrit = 0.025), d = 0.50. Furthermore, the CP
FIGURE 1 | Mean radial error (i.e., accuracy) in mm from pre-test to
post-, and retention-test. The different lines relate to the different conditions
(i.e., no practice, physical practice or combined mental and physical practice).
Error bars represent standard errors.
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TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics for performance outcome variables across pre-test, post-test, and retention-test for each of the groups in cm.
Pre-test Post-test Retention-test
Group MRE M (SD) BVE M (SD) MRE M (SD) BVE M (SD) MRE M (SD) BVE M (SD)
NP (n = 14) 70.75 (18.10) 80.68 (17.43) 54.18 (13.73) 61.58 (15.26) 60.07 (21.03) 69.88 (24.07)
PP (n = 15) 71.31 (24.53) 84.23 (27.10) 44.02 (11.48) 53.71 (16.26) 41.64 (14.75) 50.31 (17.18)
CP (n = 16) 71.76 (22.96) 82.06 (23.99) 41.01 (11.20) 47.04 (10.62) 37.50 (7.43) 46.43 (12.09)
NP, no practice; PP, physical practice; CP, combined (mental and physical) practice; MRE, mean radial error (accuracy); BVE, bivariate variable error (consistency).
and the PP group did not diﬀer in their putting consistency,
t(29) = −1.361, p = 0.184 (αcrit = 0.05), d = 0.49. For
retention-test, both the CP group, t(18.590) = −3.299, p = 0.004
(αcrit = 0.017), d = 1.23, and the PP group, t(27) = −2.534,
p = 0.017 (αcrit = 0.025), d = 0.94, performed with greater
consistency in comparison to the NP group, whereas the PP
and the CP group did not diﬀer, t(29) = −0.732, p = 0.470
(αcrit = 0.05), d = 0.26.
In sum, while only the combined practice led to more accurate
and more consistent putting after the acquisition phase, both
types of practice proved superior in improving putting accuracy
and consistency compared to no practice after a 3 day retention
interval (see also Figures 1 and 2).
Mental Representation Structure
Mean group dendrograms of the three groups from pre-, to post-
and to retention-test are displayed in Figures 3–5.
Combined Mental and Physical Practice (CP) Group
As seen in Figure 3, no structure was evident for the CP
group prior to the acquisition phase. In detail, the mean group
dendrogram of the CP group revealed only one cluster pertaining
FIGURE 2 | Bivariate variable error (i.e., consistency) in mm from
pre-test to post-, and retention-test. The different lines relate to the
different conditions (i.e., no practice, physical practice or combined mental
and physical practice). Error bars represent standard errors.
to the preparation phase (BAC 2 and 3). After the acquisition
phase, however, the mean group dendrogram was comprised
of four clusters relating to diﬀerent phases of the movement
[i.e., preparation phase (BAC 2, 3), forward swing (BAC 8, 9),
impact (BAC 10, 11, 13), and attenuation (BAC 14, 16)]. Cluster
solutions of the CP group for post- and retention-test were
similar, with the only diﬀerence being that after the 3 days
retention interval, the cluster pertaining to preparation phase
involved one more concept (BAC 2, 3, 4). Thus, for the CP
group, the number of functional clusters increased over the
course of acquisition phase, with the representation structure
becoming more elaborate over time. The descriptive changes
over time observed in the dendrograms were conﬁrmed by
analyses of invariance. Speciﬁcally, while the cluster solutions
for pre- and post-test (λ = 0.24) as well as for pre- and
retention-test (λ = 0.24) were variant (i.e., signiﬁcant changes
in the structures over practice), the two cluster solutions
of post- and retention-test (λ = 0.71) were invariant (i.e.,
no meaningful diﬀerences between representation structures).
Furthermore, increases in adjusted rand indices from pre-test
(ARIpre = 0.12) to post-test (ARIpost = 0.35) and to retention-test
(ARIretention = 0.50) indicate increasing similarity in comparison
to an expert structure and as such emphasize that the changes in
representation structure reﬂect a functional development.
Physical Practice (PP) Group
The mean group dendrograms of the PP group revealed
minimal clustering over time (see Figure 4). Speciﬁcally, while
no clustering was evident for the PP group prior and after
the acquisition phase, the retention test revealed one cluster
pertaining to preparation phase (BAC 2 and 3). As there was no
overlap in the clustering of the diﬀerent cluster solutions, analysis
of invariance resulted in values of 0. More important, increasing
adjusted rand indices over time (ARIpre = 0, ARIpost = 0,
ARIretention = 0.12) suggest a minimal development in direction
of the expert representation structure.
No Practice (NP) Group
Prior to the acquisition phase, the mean group dendrogram of
the NP group revealed one cluster relating to the preparation of
the putting movement (BAC 2 and 3; see Figure 5). After the
acquisition phase, however, a diﬀerent structure emerged which
reﬂected one cluster comprised of two functionally unrelated
concepts (BAC 4 and 16). Although being related in the sense
that both concepts involve the word “look,” these concepts are
not related during movement execution. Thus, this relation is
based on superﬁcial rather than on functional characteristics.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean group dendrograms of the combined mental and
physical practice group (n = 16) for the golf putt at (A) pre-test, (B)
post-test, and (C) retention-test. The numbers on the x-axis relate to the
BAC number, the numbers on the y-axis display Euclidean distances. The
lower the link between related BACs, the lower is the Euclidean distance. The
horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given α-level (dcrit = 3.41; α = 0.05):
links between BACs above this line are considered not related; horizontal gray
lines on the bottom mark clusters. BACs: (1) shoulders parallel to target line,
(2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, (5)
rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7)
smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders toward the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10)
impact with the ball, (11) club face square to target line at impact, (12)
follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club,
(15) direct club head to planned position, and (16) look to the outcome.
After the 3 days retention interval, no clusters were evident in the
mean group dendrogram of the NP group. Analysis of invariance
resulted in values of 0, as there was no overlap in the clustering
of the diﬀerent cluster solutions. When being compared to the
expert structure, ARIs even revealed a slight decrease in the
FIGURE 4 | Mean group dendrograms of the physical practice group
(n = 15) for the golf putt at (A) pre-test, (B) post-test, and (C)
retention-test (α = 0.05; dcrit = 3.41).
degree of similarity from pre-test (ARIpre = 0.12) to post-test
(ARIpost = −0.02) to retention-test (ARIretention = 0.00).
In sum, prior to the acquisition phase, mental representations
revealed little to no structures. Over the course of practice,
however, combined practice led to a signiﬁcant development in
mental representation structure, while physical practice only led
to little functional changes in mental representation structure
compared to no practice (see also Figures 3–5).
Gaze Behavior
Mean quiet eye durations for the three groups across pre-, post-,
and retention-test are presented in Figure 6. Quiet eye duration
did not diﬀer between groups at pre-test, F(2,41) = 0.076,
p = 0.927, η2p = 0.004. A repeated measures ANOVA on quiet
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FIGURE 5 | Mean group dendrograms of the no practice control group
(n = 14) for the golf putt at (A) pre-test, (B) post-test, and (C)
retention-test (α = 0.05; dcrit = 3.41).
eye duration indicated a signiﬁcant test day × group interaction,
F(4,82) = 6.532, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.242. However, post hoc
analyses revealed that neither the CP group, t(20.928) = 2.079,
p = 0.050 (αcrit = 0.017), d = 0.74, nor the PP group,
t(26) = 1.167, p = 0.254 (αcrit = 0.025), d = 0.44, demonstrated
longer quiet eye durations compared to the NP group after 3 days
of practice. Furthermore, the CP group and the PP group did
not diﬀer in their quiet eye duration after acquisition phase,
t(28) = 0.954, p = 0.348 (αcrit = 0.05), d = 0.35. After 3 days
of rest, however, the CP group demonstrated signiﬁcantly longer
quiet eye durations compared to the NP group, t(17.563)= 2.887,
p = 0.010 (αcrit = 0.017), d = 1.03. Again, quiet eye durations
of the PP group were not diﬀerent from those of the NP
group, t(26) = 1.418, p = 0.168 (αcrit = 0.050), d = 0.54. The
FIGURE 6 | Mean quiet eye duration in ms from pre-test to post- and
retention-test. The different lines relate to the different conditions (i.e., no
practice, physical practice or combined mental and physical practice). Error
bars represent standard errors.
diﬀerence in quiet eye duration between the CP group and the
PP group failed to reach signiﬁcance, t(28) = 1.753, p = 0.090
(αcrit = 0.025), d = 0.65.
In sum, after 3 days of rest, the duration of the quiet eye
was longer for the combined practice compared to no practice,
while this was not the case for physical practice. Interestingly,
after the retention interval, a tendency was becoming evident that
the combined practice had led to even longer quiet eye durations
than the physical practice. Thus, combined mental and physical
practice as opposed to physical practice only led to a longer quiet
eye period during the acquisition of putting skill in comparison
to no practice in the present study (see also Figure 6).
Pertaining to the relation between gaze behavior and mental
representation structure, a Pearson product-moment correlation
between quiet eye durations and individual ARIs revealed a
small positive correlation between the two variables, r = 0.286,
n = 44, p = 0.030, with better developed representation
structures relating to longer quiet eye durations after learning.
In other words, participants with the most elaborate mental
representation structure after learning also revealed the longest
duration in quiet eye behavior.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to examine the inﬂuence of
practice on the mental representation of a golf putt, gaze behavior
prior to putting (i.e., the quiet eye), and putting performance.
By doing so, we aimed at gaining further insights into the
perceptual-cognitive background of performance changes that
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occur during the process of learning a motor action. Speciﬁcally,
we were interested in whether (overt) motor changes (i.e.,
changes in putting accuracy and consistency) would be realized in
(covert) cognitive and perceptual changes (i.e., changes in mental
representation structure and quiet eye duration) as a result of two
diﬀerent practice conditions (i.e., physical practice and physical
plus mental practice in comparison to no practice).
Regarding the representation of the golf putt in long-term
memory, novices’ mental representation structures developed
over the course of practice, with the combined physical plus
mental practice leading to the most elaborate representation
structures relative to an expert structure. Physical practice alone
led to fewer changes in direction of an expert structure. No
such changes in representation structures were observed in the
control condition. The results of the present study are in line
with previous research on diﬀerences in mental representation
of complex action according to skill level, with well-experienced
athletes revealing more structured representations than their
less-experienced counterparts (e.g., Schack and Mechsner, 2006;
Bläsing et al., 2009; Velentzas et al., 2010). Moreover, the
present ﬁndings on the development of mental representation
structures over time further support the idea that the learning
of a motor action is associated with functional organization
of action-related knowledge in long-term memory (e.g., Frank
et al., 2013, 2014; Land et al., 2014). As expected, representation
structures developed most during combined physical plus
mental practice, while during physical practice only, less
development was evident. Representation structures of the group
that incorporated mental practice into their practice regimen
revealed several functional clusters of BACs in the present study.
Clusters were functional in the sense that they pertained to
the functional movement phases of the putt (i.e., preparation,
forward swing/impact, attenuation) after a retention interval
of 3 days. For the group practicing only physically, mental
representation structure revealed fewer, but some clustering at
retention-test, while no clustering was evident for the group not
practicing at all. Thus, the results of the present study conﬁrm
the ﬁndings by Frank et al. (2013, 2014) such that when spending
time practicing, the mental representation structure of a complex
motor action develops functionally (i.e., becomes more similar to
the representation of an expert).
A main aim of the present study was to further investigate
the perceptual-cognitive background of performance changes by
having a closer look at the quiet eye and its changes over the
course of learning. In the present study, the combined physical
plus mental practice led to longer quiet eye periods (i.e., longer
ﬁxation durations prior to putting) compared to no practice.
This ﬁnding ﬁts well into the body of research on the quiet
eye, which has repeatedly shown longer quiet eye durations for
higher-skilled athletes in comparison to lower-skilled athletes
(e.g., Vickers, 1992, 1996; for an overview, see Vickers, 2007).
More importantly, our results extend ﬁndings on diﬀerences
in quiet eye behavior between skilled and unskilled individuals
by providing insight into the change in quiet eye behavior over
the course of practice. First, to our knowledge, the present study
is the ﬁrst to show that quiet eye duration changes in novices
practicing a complex motor action. Speciﬁcally, the present
ﬁndings show that practice is associated with a longer quiet
eye period. Second, the quiet eye developed alongside of mental
representations in the present study, with mental representation
structures and quiet eye durations relating to one another after
learning. This indicates that the more elaborate information-
processing during movement preparation, as expressed by longer
quiet eye durations, is based onmore elaborate underlyingmental
representations in long-term memory. As such, the results of
the present study further support the notion that the quiet
eye is rooted in the cognitive domain (e.g., Williams et al.,
2002; Klostermann et al., 2014; Gonzalez et al., 2015), reﬂecting
critical action-related information processing that is based on
the representation available. This might be indicative of quiet
eye duration reﬂecting a predicitive mode of control initiating
a cognitively demanding process of motor planning. In order
to address this in more detail, future studies are planned to
investigate the link between structure formation in long-term
memory, capacity in short-term memory (i.e., chunking2) and
their relationship to the quiet eye, as they relate to the learning
of a motor action.
Regarding performance changes over time, outcome
performance improved over the course of practice in the
present study, with both types of practice leading to improved
accuracy and consistency. Improvements in performance
persisted over 3 days of no practice, thus reﬂecting stable
changes. In this sense, and according to the traditional view of
motor learning, both practice conditions (i.e., physical practice
and physical practice plus mental practice) led to motor learning
(e.g., Magill, 2011; Schmidt and Lee, 2011). Relatively permanent
changes in putting performance as a result of practice as found in
the present study are in line with the general idea that repeatedly
executing a motor action leads to improved performance of that
motor action (e.g., Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981).
Interestingly, additional mental practice did not lead to
superior putting performance in the present study. One reason
why additional mental practice might not have contributed to
superior overt putting performance in the present study is the
smaller relative magnitude of eﬀect that mental practice has
in comparison to physical practice. Meta-analyses investigating
the relative magnitude of eﬀect between mental and physical
practice emphasize the superiority of physical practice over
mental practice (e.g., Feltz et al., 1988; Driskell et al., 1994). For
instance, Driskell et al. (1994) reported strong eﬀect sizes for
physical practice (d = 0.78) and moderate eﬀect sizes for mental
practice (d = 0.53). Hence, the smaller magnitude of eﬀect may
be one reason why additional mental practice in the present study
did not prove eﬀective in further enhancing motor performance
and supporting motor learning on the motor output level. As
a consequence, extending the practice phase (i.e., amount of
sessions and/ or amount of trials) may elicit a distinct eﬀect of
additional mental practice.
Related to that, a second plausible explanation for the lack of
diﬀerences between physical plus mental practice and physical
practice only may be that mental practice eﬀects may not
primarily become evident in terms of overt performance during
2We thank the reviewer for his/her comments related to this point.
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early skill acquisition. Focusing on motor performance, Driskell
et al. (1994) had a closer look at mental practice eﬀects relative
to level of expertise (i.e., novice vs. experienced individuals)
in their meta-analysis. In novices, mental practice was found
to be more beneﬁcial for cognitive tasks in comparison to
motor tasks, while experienced individuals proﬁted both in
cognitive and motor tasks (between-task comparison). More
recently, ﬁndings reported by Frank et al. (2014) suggested
that mental practice particularly promotes the cognitive level
of action organization in novices practicing a motor action
(within-task comparison). Speciﬁcally, the authors examined
the development of mental representation structure over the
course of learning in novices, practicing either by imagery, by
execution, by a combination of both, or did not practice at
all. From this study, mental practice has shown to particularly
promote representation structure development, resulting inmore
elaborate representation structures for the groups involving
mental practice. This suggests that mental practice particularly
aﬀects the perceptual-cognitive level at an early stage of motor
learning. Accordingly, these changes do not necessarily have
to transfer one-to-one to the motor output level, and thus do
not necessarily or only minimally have to be reﬂected in overt
outcome performance.
In the present study, combined physical plus mental practice
contributed to both more elaborate representation structures of
the putt and longer quiet eye durations before initiation of the
putting movement as well as improved putting performance in
comparison to the control group. In contrast, physical practice
led to improved putting performance, but to fewer changes
in representation structures and shorter quiet eye durations.
Moreover, in comparison to the physical practice condition,
combined practice particularly promoted perceptual-cognitive
changes within the motor action system. First, representation
structures of the combined group were more similar to an expert
structure compared to the ones of the physical practice group.
Second, while not statistically signiﬁcant, the diﬀerence between
the two practice groups after the retention interval indicated a
medium eﬀect size (d = 0.65), with the combined practice leading
to longer ﬁxation durations. From these ﬁndings, combined
practice seems to have inﬂuenced the motor system diﬀerently
than physical practice only, with combined physical plus mental
practice inﬂuencing the motor action system more so on a
perceptual-cognitive level.
This might be indicative of a diﬀerential inﬂuence of mental
practice (i.e., repeated motor imagery) and physical practice (i.e.,
repeated motor execution) with regards to diﬀerent levels within
the motor action system (e.g., Frank et al., 2014). While the
principle of functional equivalence (Finke, 1979; Johnson, 1980;
Jeannerod, 1994, 1995) and the simulation theory (Jeannerod,
2001, 2006) postulate that the imagery and the execution of
an action are functionally equivalent, as both states to some
degree involve the activation of the motor action system, this
principle does not specify the (similar or diﬀerential) inﬂuence
that each of these states of action has on the motor action
system during learning (for related discussions, see e.g., Munzert
et al., 2009; Guillot et al., 2013; Wakeﬁeld et al., 2013). In
other words, the unique potential of mental practice and
physical practice to induce changes on diﬀerent levels within the
motor action system during learning remains to be speciﬁed.
Using a four group design (mental practice, physical practice,
mental and physical practice, no practice), Frank et al. (2014)
investigated the inﬂuence of mental and physical practice on
mental representation development in novices. After the same
amount of practice, the groups practicing by way of motor
imagery (either solely or in combination with motor execution),
revealedmore functional representation structures after learning,
while no diﬀerences were evident in overt motor performance
between the practice groups after learning. A similar pattern (i.e.,
no diﬀerences in overt motor performance, but diﬀerences in
covert perceptual-cognitive variables) was found in the present
study, which might be interpreted as further evidence that mental
practice operates primarily on higher levels within the motor
action system during early skill acquisition (for a more detailed
discussion, see Frank, 2014; Frank et al., 2014).
It is important to note, however, that the amount of practice
trials diﬀered between the two practice groups in the present
study, with the combined group practicing mentally in addition
to the physical practice. Therefore, an alternative explanation for
the diﬀerences between practice groups in the present study is
the diﬀerence in amount of practice. Speciﬁcally, the combined
physical plus mental practice group practiced twice the amount
of trials (30 executed plus 30 imagined putts per practice session)
than did the physical practice group (30 executed putts per
practice session) in the present study. Thus, any diﬀerence found
between the two practice groups might be solely attributed to the
diﬀerence in amount of practice and not to mental practice itself.
Future research is needed in order to investigate the diﬀerential
eﬀect of physical and mental practice on the perceptual-cognitive
components of motor action, and the quiet eye in particular.
To conclude, the present study shed light on the perceptual-
cognitive background of performance changes during motor
learning. By doing so, it was possible to gain further insights
relating to three research areas: (1) as for quiet eye research, we
were able to show by way of a longitudinal design that the quiet
eye becomes longer in novices practicing a motor action, and
that quiet eye durations relate to the degree of development in
underlying representation structures; (2) as for motor imagery
research, this study was the ﬁrst to investigate motor learning
incorporating motor imagery with a focus on the quiet eye as
a window into action-related information processes; and (3) as
for motor learning research in general, we demonstrated the
value of looking at motor skill acquisition from diﬀerent angles,
considering both overt changes in motor performance and covert
perceptual-cognitive changes which take place within the motor
action system during learning. Taking a multifaceted view in
future studies may contribute to bringing forward research on
some of the remaining unanswered questions in our ﬁelds.
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